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Abstract
We develop an endogenous growth model to study the long run consequences of oﬀshoring
with ﬁrm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model oﬀshoring as the
geographical fragmentation of a ﬁrm’s production chain between a home upstream division and a
foreign downstream one. On the positive side, we show that, when contracts are incomplete, the
possibility of oﬀshoring has favorable implications for economic growth. Yet, oﬀshoring induced
by a higher bargaining power of the upstream division can hamper growth: while there is always
a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and oﬀshoring activities, there is a
non-monotonic relationship between these and growth. Whether oﬀshoring with incomplete
contracts also increases consumption depends on ﬁrm heterogeneity. On the normative side, we
show that, whereas with complete contract eﬃciency is restored through a subsidy to R&D only,
with incomplete contracts a production subsidy to oﬀshored upstream divisions is needed too.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Oﬀshoring, along with debates and literature related to it, has enjoyed an exponential growth in
recent years. In particular, the controversy on the issue exploded in February 2004 when N. Gregory
Mankiw rationalized oﬀshoring through its long term positive consequences on the US economy.
He argued that oﬀshoring may release domestic resources that can be reallocated to the creation
of new products, new technologies and thus new and better jobs to replace those lost to cheaper
foreign countries.1 Trade economists have since rushed to support. Blinder (2006) calls oﬀshoring
the third industrial revolution, which can eventually be a sound occurrence for all workers, as the
ﬁrst and the second were regardless of initial skepticism. Baldwin (2006) calls the process "a second
unbundling" that has occurred as a consequence of rapidly falling communication and coordination
costs. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) argue how traditional trade theory must give way for
a paradigm more relevant to today’s world, namely trade in "tasks". They show the beneﬁts of this
phenomenon by pointing out its positive impact on real wages of all workers in the home country.2
Finally, Rodriguez-Clare (2009) uses a dynamic model to show that the negative terms of trade eﬀect
of oﬀshoring is outweighed by long-run gains as the origin country adjusts its research eﬀort.
Our aim is to contribute to this debate by highlighting possible gains and losses from oﬀshoring in
an endogenous growth scenario with heterogeneous ﬁrms where the economic beneﬁts of research and
development (R&D) are not fully appropriable by innovators and some of the contracts supporting
production abroad are incomplete.
We develop our argument by modeling an economy consisting of two countries, North and South,
and two sectors, production and R&D. The North is the market for ﬁnal products, which are horizon-
tally diﬀerentiated. Varieties are supplied according to blueprints that are invented and patented by
1Oﬀshoring is frequently blamed by workers and trade unions for the slow pace of job growth in the United States
and for the swelling wage diﬀerential between low and high skill workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001).
2In their contribution, the positive eﬀect of oﬀshoring on wages is driven by a productivity eﬀect as oﬀshoring
translates into a form of technological progress. These results are qualiﬁed in Kohler (2004) and in Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007), where domestic workers only beneﬁt if the labor cost savings of oﬀshoring are associated with
the labor intensive sector.
2R&D labs. In the wake of Grossman and Helpman (1991), endogenous growth is introduced through
a positive learning externality in R&D.
To enter the production market, entrepreneurs must ﬁrst purchase a patent, and then engage in
process innovation with uncertain outcome to ﬁnd their capacity in using the patent. In particular,
an entrepreneur’s capacity is determined by a random draw from some common productivity distri-
bution as in Melitz (2003). Each entrepreneur organizes production along a vertical chain consisting
of two stages, intermediate supply ("upstream") and ﬁnal assembly ("downstream"), performed by
two divisions within a vertically integrated ﬁrm. Vertical integration is due to the presence of tacit
knowledge that cannot be transmitted outside ﬁrm boundaries. Both R&D and ﬁnal assembly are
assumed to take place in North only. Intermediates can be produced in North or South. This
is assumed to be a potential site for the production of intermediates using a standardized tradi-
tional technology that oﬀers productivity gains to entrepreneurs with bad draws, provided that they
are willing to bear the additional trade costs associated with international shipments.3 We call
"inshoring" an organizational structure in which both production stages take place in North and
"oﬀshoring" the alternative organizational structure in which intermediates are ﬁrst produced in
South and then assembled in North.
The two countries diﬀer in terms of the quality of contract enforcement between divisions. Specif-
ically, contracts are complete when both the upstream and the downstream divisions are located in
North. They are incomplete when the upstream division is located in South due to the lack of credible
institutions to perfectly enforce contracts.4 We model contractual incompleteness following recent
contributions that study ﬁrms’ ownership and location choices in environments in which economic
3Using Japanese ﬁrm level data from the period 1994-2000, Hijzen, Inui, and Todo (2007) give empirical evidence
on how the scope for productivity improvements from oﬀshoring depends negatively on the initial level of productivity
of the ﬁrm. This in turn provides an eﬀective channel for less productive ﬁrms to catch up and restore competitiveness.
4Nunn (2007) for instance uses several proxies to measure contract incompleteness in the South: a weighed average
of a number of variables that measure individuals’ perceptions of the eﬀectiveness and predictability of the judiciary
and the enforcement of contracts in 159 countries between 1997 and 1998 from Kaufmann et al. (2003); the measures
of judicial quality and contract enforcement from Gwartney and Lawson (2003) and World Bank (2004).
3interactions suﬀer from hold up problems.5 More precisely, we follow Grossman and Helpman (2002)
in adopting the transaction cost approach à la Williamson (1975, 1985), whose key idea is that the
quality of deliverables in a bilateral transaction is unobservable by third parties so that, after the
deliverables have been produced, the stakeholders involved in the transaction have to bargain on
some division of the surplus it would generate.6 However, by assuming that upstream-downstream
transactions take place within the boundaries of ﬁrms, we abstract from the ownership decision and
focus, instead, on the location decision. In other words, what generates contractual incompleteness
is not the crossing of ﬁrms’ boundaries but rather the crossing of countries’ borders.
This setup generates new positive and normative insights on the dynamic and static aggregate
eﬀects of oﬀshoring. On the positive side, we show that, when contracts are incomplete, the pos-
sibility of oﬀshoring has favorable implications for economic growth. That does not happen when
contracts are complete, in which case oﬀshoring has no impact whatsoever on growth. The key
parameter regulating the growth eﬀect of oﬀshoring with incomplete contracts is the bargaining
power of upstream divisions. In particular, we show that, while a marginal increase in the bargain-
ing power of upstream divisions always encourages more ﬁrms to oﬀshore, it fosters growth only if
such bargaining power is initially small enough. Otherwise, oﬀshoring activities encouraged by a
stronger upstream bargaining power slows down growth. Lastly, we show that whether oﬀshoring
with incomplete contracts also favors steady state consumption depends on ﬁrm heterogeneity. For
example, when productivity draws are Pareto distributed, consumption increases when there are a
lot of unproductive ﬁrms and very few productive ones.
On the normative side, we highlight that, just like in Grossman and Helpman (1991), with oﬀ-
shoring under complete contracts the endogenous growth rate of the economy is suboptimally low
due the positive learning externality in R&D. In this case, eﬃciency is restored through a subsidy to
R&D only. This is, instead, not enough under incomplete contracts as the hold up problem causes
underproduction. Accordingly, with incomplete contracts, the R&D subsidy has to be complemented
5See Helpman (2006) for a survey.
6See, e.g., Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) for the alternative property-rights approach to model
incomplete contracts and hold up problems à la Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) .
4by a production subsidy to oﬀshored upstream divisions.7
To the best of our knowldge, our analysis represents the ﬁrst attempt to study the long run
consequences of oﬀshoring with ﬁrm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. A large branch of the
international trade literature on ﬁrm organization has been devoted to the incomplete nature of
contracts in arrangements between ﬁrms. On the dynamic side of this front, Naghavi and Ottaviano
(2006, 2008, 2009) use a growth model à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) to study the potential ten-
sion that may arise between the static and dynamic implications of the fragmentation of production.
They ﬁnd that while outsourcing gives rise to complementary upstream and downstream innovation,
incomplete contracts may prevent static gains of specialized production from carrying through in
the long run. They also ﬁnd that oﬀshoring can slow growth by reducing the feedback from oﬀ-
shored plants to labs. Yet, in their model there is no ﬁrm heterogeneity so that, in equilibrium,
ﬁrms either all outsource or they all vertically integrate.8 Grossman and Helpman (2004), Antràs
and Helpman (2004) and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) are among the ﬁrst papers to study
the organization of ﬁrms in the presence of heterogeneity in a static set up. Our contribution adds
to this literature by studying the industry dynamics of ﬁrm organization, in particular the interac-
tions between oﬀshoring and growth.9 Our model also diﬀers from previous work the organizational
choices of heterogeneous ﬁrms as we do not apply the typical extra ﬁxed cost that generally leads
more productive ﬁrms to undertake a more costly form of organization. This helps us avert potential
misleading assumptions as it is not clear how ﬁxed costs can be ranked across organizational forms.10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 charac-
7This stresses a novel reason to support FDI that supplements those already highlighted in the literature. See,
e.g., Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, Ch.10).
8The same is true in the Ricardian growth model by Ottaviano (2009).
9The only other growth models with heterogeneous ﬁrms to our knowledge are Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008)
and Segerstrom and Gustaﬀson (2009), which explore the impact of trade liberalization on growth in the presence of
heterogeneous ﬁrms. These papers, however, do not investigate the impact of contractual incompleteness.
10For instance, Antràs and Helpman (2004) assume that ﬁxed costs of vertical integration are larger while Grossman,
Helpman and Szeidl (2005) suppose that outsourcing ﬁx e dc o s t sa r em o r es u b s t a n t i a l .
5terizes the market equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the interactions between oﬀshoring, innovation
and economic growth. Section 5 highlights the role of contractual incompleteness in determining the
long run eﬀects of oﬀshoring. Section 6 concludes.
2A D y n a m i c M o d e l o f O ﬀshoring
The economy consists of two countries, North and South. We assume that all workers and consumers
belong to the North but can be employed in South as expatriates to work in the oﬀshored plants.
Hence the South is simply a potential production site. This emphasizes the tacitness of knowledge
by ruling out perfect substitutability of Southern labor for Northern labor, with the intention of
abstracting from typical labor market debates on wages that have been widely studied empirically
and are being widely studied theoretically parallel to the writing of this paper.11 This helps single out
the additional impacts of oﬀshoring on growth in the home country that have often been neglected in
the literature. In addition, observed empirical evidence does not always approve of the phenomenon
of one job shifted abroad being immediately one job released at home.12
2.1 Overview and timing of events
Before getting into the details of the model, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the way it works.
Consumers have CES preferences over a horizontally diﬀerentiated good . The production of each
variety of good  requires a blueprint, an intermediate input and assembly. Blueprints are created
by independent R&D labs that sell their blueprints to entrepreneurs. All labs operate in North.
An entrepreneur discovers her ability to turn the acquired blueprint in a sellable product only after
buying. Her ability is determined by a random productivity draw. Upon observing its productivity ,
the entrepreneur organizes her ﬁrm as a vertical value chain with an "upstream" division producing
the intermediate input and a "downstream" division turning it into the ﬁnal product. While ﬁnal
production takes place in North, the ﬁrm can either "inshore" intermediate production in North,
11For recent theoretical analyses of oﬀshoring as means of trade and its eﬀects on real wages see Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodriguez-Clare (2009).
12See for instance Debande (2006) for the US and Japanese cases.
6using its own technology, or "oﬀshore" it to South using a cost-reducing standardized technology. In
this way, oﬀshoring oﬀers a viable alternative to the least eﬃcient ﬁrms only. This alternative comes
with strings attached. On the one hand, shipping intermediates from South to North incurs trade
costs. On the other hand, oﬀshoring takes place under contractual incompleteness, which generates
further costs due to ex post bargaining.
To summarize, in each period  the following sequence of events take place. First, independent
labs engage in R&D to create new patented blueprints. Second, entrepreneurs enter by purchasing
a blueprint, realize their productivity levels in terms of non-standardized production and choose the
location of upstream divisions. Third, upstream divisions manufacture the inputs needed by their
downstream counterparts. Fourth, once intermediate production is completed, the upstream and
downstream divisions of producers that have oﬀshored bargain over the share of total revenues from
ﬁnal sales and inputs are handed over by the former to the latter. Lastly, ﬁnal assembly takes place
and ﬁnal products are sold to households.
2.2 Demand side
There are  inﬁnitely-lived households with identical preferences deﬁned over the consumption of
a horizontally diﬀerentiated good . The utility function is assumed to be instantaneously Cobb-














is a CES quantity index in which () is the consumption of variety , () is the number of available
varieties of good ,a n d is the own and cross demand elasticity of any variety, and thus an inverse
measure of the degree of product diﬀerentiation between varieties. Households have perfect foresight
and they can borrow and lend freely in a perfect capital market at instantaneous interest rate ().
Using multi-stage budgeting to solve their utility maximization problem, households ﬁrst allocate
7their income ﬂow between savings and expenditures. This yields a time path of total expenditures




= () −  (2)
where we have used the fact that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals unity. By








Households then allocate their expenditures across all varieties, which yields the instantaneous
demand function
()=()()−  ∈ [0()] (4)




is aggregate demand. Throughout the rest of the paper, we leave the time dependence of variables
implicit when this does not generate confusion.
2.3 Supply side
There are two factors of production in the economy. Labor is inelastically supplied by households
and each household supplies one unit of labor so that we can use  to refer both to the number
of households and the total endowment of labor. Labor is freely mobile between countries and
it is chosen as numeraire. The other factor is knowledge capital in the form of blueprints for
the production of diﬀerentiated varieties. Blueprints are protected by inﬁnitely lived patents and
depreciate at a constant rate .
There are two sectors, innovation (R&D) and production. Perfectly competitive labs invent blue-
prints for the production of the diﬀerentiated varieties. The production of each variety requires a
single blueprint and consists of an upstream and a downstream stage. Entrepreneurs enter by buying
8the rights to use the blueprints and split their activities between an upstream division supplying
intermediates and a downstream division assembling them. Assembly takes place only in North
whereas intermediate inputs can be produced also in South using an older standardized traditional
technology ("oﬀshoring"). Southern production takes place through a standardized traditional tech-
nology, which allows one unit of labor to produce   0 units of intermediates.
Shipping the intermediate inputs back to the North for assembly incurs iceberg trade costs:
1 units must be shipped for one unit to reach destination. Trade costs can be embedded into
the productivity parameter of the South without loss of generality. Hence, throughout the rest of
the paper, we will use  =  to denote the standard southern technology inclusive of trade
costs. Northern production can rely on new advanced technologies that are generated by process
innovation. This is a risky endeavor as long as its outcome is uncertain and the property rights on
patents have to be bought in advance before experimenting new production processes. Speciﬁcally,
after buying the rights to use the blueprints from labs, producers randomly draw their productivity
level  from a continuous cumulative distribution () with support [0∞) so that oﬀshoring oﬀers
productivity gains to producers with bad draws  . Final assembly in turn needs one unit of
the intermediate component for each unit of the ﬁnal good no matter where intermediates originate
from. Intermediates are variety-speciﬁc: once produced for a certain assembly line, they have no
alternative use.
Oﬀshoring is associated with contractual costs that arise from weak legal institutions in the
South. Speciﬁcally, only high quality variety-speciﬁc intermediates can be processed whereas low
quality ones are useless even though supplied at zero cost. Contracts between the upstream and
the downstream divisions are complete when botha r el o c a t e di nN o r t h ,b u ti n c o m p l e t ew h e nt h e
upstream division is oﬀshored to South. In this case the quality of intermediates can not be assessed
by third parties. That generates a hold up problem: after the upstream division has supplied its
speciﬁc input, it has to reach an agreement with the downstream division on how to share the joint
surplus (revenues) from ﬁnal sales. The agreement is reached through Nash bargaining and we
denote the bargaining weight of the upstream division by .
9Finally, we introduce endogenous growth by assuming that R&D faces a learning curve so that the
marginal R&D cost of blueprints decreases with the number of blueprints that have been successfully
introduced in the past. Speciﬁcally, the invention of a new blueprint requires  units of labor where
0 is a parameter and  is the total number of blueprints that have already been patented.13
Given the chosen functional form, some initial stock of implemented blueprints 0  0 is needed to
have ﬁnite costs of innovation at all times. We assume that this stock belongs to North.
3 Market Equilibrium
3.1 Production
At time  the instantaneous equilibrium is found by solving the model backwards from ﬁnal produc-
tion to R&D. Varieties can be sold to ﬁnal customers by two types of producers: "inshorers" have
both divisions in North whereas "oﬀshorers" have their upstream divisions in South and their down-
stream ones in North. Under inshoring, as contracts are complete, the upstream and downstream
divisions of the same ﬁrm ﬁrst maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and then share it according to their bargain-
ing weights. This implies that the upstream division of a producer with labor productivity  selects
intermediate output () to maximize operating proﬁt ()=() = ()() where
(), () and () are ﬁnal revenues, ﬁnal price and ﬁnal output (itself equal to intermediate






with associated output ()=()=()− and operating proﬁt ()=() =
()1−.A s h a r e  of () goes to the upstream division and the rest to the downstream
one.
13The assumed shape of the learning curve serves analytical solvability and the comparison with Grossman and
Helpman (1991). In equilibrium it yields a ‘size eﬀect’, meaning that larger countries grow faster. To avoid this this
prediction that runs against the empirical evidence, one could assume that the intensity of the learning spillover is
lower, i.e.  with 0 1 (Jones, 1995). This would turn our setup into a quasi-endogenous growth model in
the wake of Segerstrom (1998).
10Under oﬀshoring, the producer uses the standardized technology with upstream labor produc-
tivity  and gets the joint surplus of its divisions under incomplete contracts. This surplus is given
by the revenues from ﬁnal sales and is divided between divisions through ex post Nash bargaining.
Absent any outside option, revenues are therefore split according to the bargaining weights of the
t w op a r t i e sw i t has h a r e(1 −) going to the downstream division and the remaining share  going
to the upstream one. The upstream division decides how much input  to produce anticipating
that bargaining outcome. Hence, it maximizes  =  −  where  and  are ﬁnal price
and ﬁnal output (itself equal to intermediate production). Given the demand curve (4), this yields






with associated output  =  = −
 and revenues  =  = 1−
 .14 As h a r e =
(1 − ) goes to the downstream division while the complementary share goes to the upstream
one. Accordingly, after subtracting labor costs, the upstream division is left with  = :
larger upstream bargaining weight and stronger product diﬀerentiation shift a larger share of a
given joint surplus  from downstream to upstream divisions. Hence, the overall operating proﬁt
of the oﬀshorer is  =  +  =[ 1+(  − 1)(1 − )].15 Since the downstream division does
not contribute anything before the bargaining stage, the joint surplus  (and the joint proﬁt  as
well) is at its maximum when  goes to one. In other words, when  goes to one, the incomplete
contract outcome converges to the complete contract one.
As producers can freely choose between inshoring and oﬀshoring, the operating proﬁts they earn
are equal to () ≡ max[()] The fact that () is an increasing function of productivity 
implies that there exists a unique threshold productivity level ("cutoﬀ") ∗ above which producers
14The upstream division does not face an incentive constraint as the optimal output is always positive.
15For the upstream division the adverse incentive due to ex post bargaining under incomplete contracts has exactly
t h es a m ei m p a c ta sa ni c e b e r gt r a d ec o s tt h a tm e l t saf r a c t i o n(1 − ) of intermediate output shipped from South to
North, and therefore does not generate revenues for that division. The fact that here the fraction (1 − ) of revenues
is recovered by the downstream division explains why the overall operating proﬁto ft h eo ﬀshorer is larger than that
of the simple iceberg case.
11prefer to inshore. This cutoﬀ solves (∗)= and is therefore equal to
∗ =( )[1+(1− )( − 1)]
1
−1 (6)
The cutoﬀ is decreasing in  because weaker product diﬀerentiation shifts surplus from upstream
to downstream divisions exacerbating intermediate underproduction and thus promoting inshoring.
For symmetric reasons, the cutoﬀ is increasing in the upstream bargaining weight .I t i s a l s o
increasing in  as oﬀshoring is fostered by any improvement in the productivity of the standardized
technology  or any fall in trade cost .
We can therefore highlight:
Proposition 1 A marginal increase in the bargaining weight of upstream divisions encourages more
ﬁrms to oﬀshore.
Since 1() is the amount of labor embedded in unit revenues, it will turn out to be useful
to denote by e  ≡  the "delivered" productivity of oﬀshored labor. We will call this simply
"oﬀshored productivity" and we will contrast it with producer-speciﬁc "inshored productivity" .
Note that (6) shows that a marginal producer drawing exactly ∗ has higher inshored than oﬀshored
productivity (∗  e )s ot h a tt h er a n g e( e  ∗)i d e n t i ﬁes producers whose decisions to oﬀshore
reduce aggregate productivity. Moreover, due to ∗  0,t h ec u t o ﬀ ∗ achieves its maximum
value  at  equal to 1, so any other value of  implies ∗  . Hence, incomplete contracts
generate two adverse eﬀects of oﬀshoring on aggregate productivity. First, ﬁrms drawing values of
 between e  and ∗ oﬀshore while they have higher inshored productivity. Second, ﬁrms drawing
values between ∗ and  do not oﬀshore whereas in the absence of contractual frictions doing
so would increase their productivity. In Figure 1 we call these adverse eﬀects penalization 1 and
penalization 2 respectively. Indeed, when  is equal to 1, (6) implies ∗ = e  =  so that all ﬁrms
with a productivity level   oﬀshore and their decision to do so improves aggregate productivity.






























At the innovation stage, labs invent new blueprints at a marginal cost that depends on acquired








 ≡ ,  is labor employed in inventing new blueprints,  is its productivity and  is
the rate of depreciation.
Due to learning, as innovation cumulates, it becomes increasingly cheaper to introduce new
blueprints and, being priced at marginal cost, their value falls through time. Speciﬁcally, if we





Labs pay their researchers by borrowing at the interest rate  and know that the resulting patents
will generate instantaneous dividends equal to the expected proﬁts of the corresponding producers .
Arbitrage in the capital market then requires the dividends  and capital gains
·
 to match interest
payments  and depreciation  so that:







where the equality is granted by the deﬁnition of .
3.3 Aggregation
In characterizing the aggregate behavior of our heterogeneous economy, we follow Melitz (2003) and
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Figure 1: Industry partition










is the average (output weighted) productivity of inshorers. Since ∗  e ,w eh a v ee   ∗  e ,
e   e e and e ∗  0. Figure 1 shows a ranking of the productivity levels.16
We also deﬁne  as the share of expenditures going to oﬀshorers, and  and  as the cor-
responding exact price and quantity indices such that  = . Analogously, we deﬁne  as
the share of expenditures going to inshorers, and  and  as the corresponding exact price and






,  = {[1 − (∗)]}
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,  = {(∗)}
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 + [1 − (∗)] e 1−

ª 1
1− ,  =


16While   is larger than ∗ in Figure 1, this is not always necessarily the case.
143.4 Financial market clearing
Since producers discover their productivity only after acquiring the right to use a patented blueprint,
the dividends they are willing to pay to labs equal their expected operating proﬁts
 = (∗) +[ 1− (∗)]e  (12)
where, since  = [(∗)], the operating proﬁto fat y p i c a lo ﬀshorer  can be rewritten in
terms of aggregate variables as
 =
[1 + ( − 1)(1 − )]
(∗)

















where Ω ≡ (1 − ) is the share of aggregate expenditures accruing to the downstream divisions
of oﬀshorers. Expression (13) shows that expected proﬁts are an increasing function of Ω.W h e n
a higher share of expenditures in the economy goes to oﬀshorers, expected proﬁts are larger in the
industry. To see this, note that keeping ﬁxed total expenditure  and the proportion of oﬀshoring
ﬁrms (∗), shifting a unit of expenditures from inshorers  to oﬀshorers  increases average
proﬁts because the downstream oﬀshored divisions earn a share 1 −  of revenues  while the
inshored ones only earn a share 1 −  of proﬁts  = .17 This also explains why the positive
impact of Ω on  is larger when  is larger. Larger downstream bargaining power (1 − ) also
increases expected proﬁt sa tt h et i m eo fe n t r y .







[1 + ( − 1)Ω] −
˙ 

−  −  (14)
17Inshores have a higher sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution as with oﬀshoring all variable costs of producing
intermediates are passed over to upstream suppliers. See Grossman and Helpman (2002, p. 102) for more detail.
153.5 Labor market clearing
Aggregate labor endowment  is absorbed by innovation ()a sw e l la sb yi n s h o r e da n do ﬀshored
upstream production. Inshorers’ and oﬀshorers’ employment levels amount to  = (e e ) and
 = () respectively. Accordingly, given (11), total employment in upstream production
simpliﬁes to















(1 − Ω) (15)
Employment in production is a decreasing function of the share Ω of aggregate expenditures accruing
to the downstream divisions of oﬀshorers. This is the dual of the previously discussed result that
expected proﬁts increase with Ω as long as larger expected proﬁts induce a reallocation of labor from
production to R&D.
4O ﬀshoring and Growth
The market clearing conditions (14) and (15) deﬁne a dynamic system in two unknowns: the growth
rate of the stock of patents (

) and the expenditures level (). A unique balanced growth path
exists along which these variables are constant and is achieved without any transition dynamics.18
Calling the corresponding growth rate and expenditures level by  and  respectively, then im-
posing
·
 = ,  =  and
·















(1 − Ω) − ,  =  +  (16)
While expenditures  do not depend on Ω, the growth rate  is instead an increasing function of
Ω. The reason is that, by deﬁnition, a rise in Ω shifts expenditures from inshorers to oﬀshorers. This
shift, as discussed above, generates larger expected proﬁts and smaller employment in production.
The resulting reallocation of labor from production to R&D promotes innovation and growth.
18See Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.3) for details.
16Since  does not depend on Ω, the bargaining weight  does not aﬀect expenditures. It aﬀects,
however, the growth rate through various channels funneled through the impact of Ω on .T o
disentangle these channels, we use (10) and (11) to rewrite the share Ω of expenditures accruing to
the downstream divisions of oﬀshorers as













where e  ≡  is oﬀshored productivity and e  is the average (oﬀshored and inshored) productivity
as deﬁn e di n( 1 0 ) . S i n c eΩ  0, the sign of the impact of  on  depends on the sign of
Ω. This can be decomposed as:
Ω





where  ≡ .
Consider a marginal increase in .T h eﬁrst term on the right hand side is the direct eﬀect of
larger .I ti sn e g a t i v ea si ti d e n t i ﬁes the corresponding fall in the share of expenditures accruing to
the downstream divisions of oﬀshorers holding the overall share of expenditures accruing to oﬀshorers
constant. It captures a pure surplus reallocation between divisions as a higher upstream bargaining
weight transfers surplus from downstream to oﬀshored upstream divisions.
The second term on the right hand side of (17) is the indirect eﬀect.I t i d e n t i ﬁes the change
in the overall share of expenditures accruing to oﬀshorers. This adjustment takes place along two
margins: the relative number of oﬀs h o r e r sa sd e t e r m i n e db y(∗) ("extensive margin") and their











where e  = ˜ 1−. The impact of larger  is positive on both margins. Since a larger bargaining
weight of upstream divisions alleviates their underproduction of intermediates, as  rises not only
more producers decide to oﬀshore, but also oﬀshorers become larger. Along the extensive margin,
by (6) we have ∗  0 and thus (∗)  0. Along the intensive margin, using e  ≡ 

























which, given ∗  0 and (∗)∗  0, is an increasing function of  (see Appendix 1 for a
proof that  (e )  0). Hence, we can conclude that   0,w h i c h ,g i v e n( 1 7 ) ,i m p l i e s
that improved contract enforcement in the South has ambiguous eﬀects on Ω and, therefore, on .
To shed light on such ambiguity, we can manipulate (17) to show that a higher bargaining weight
of upstream divisions promotes growth when the elasticity of the oﬀshorers’ market share  to  is







If the reverse is true, a higher bargaining weight of upstream divisions hampers growth. Figure 1
shows the eﬀect of an increase in  on the productivity distribution of ﬁrms graphically. Larger 
directly raises e , while it reduces [1 − (∗)] e  through a change in ∗. This makes the change in
average productivity e  ambiguous in , yet inferior to the rise in e . Also, the productivity range
along which oﬀshoring raises aggregate productivity increases if the change in the intensive margin
is larger than that in the extensive margin (e   ∗) so that the two values converge, and
falls if the opposite holds so that they diverge. Finally, note that the values achieved by lnln
at  =0and at  =1are both strictly positive and ﬁnite provided that the elasticity of the extensive
margin ln(∗)ln∗ is also positive and ﬁnite, as in the case of all the commonly used families
of cumulative density functions (see Appendix 2 for a proof). Then, since (1 − ) equals zero at
 =0and goes to inﬁnity when  goes to one, there must exist a threshold value of  below which
the inequality (19) holds and above which it is violated. Hence, there exists a unique threshold value
for the bargaining weight of upstream divisions  such that Ω  ()0 and, thus,   ()0
if and only if  f a l l sb e l o w( a b o v e )t h a tv a l u e .
Hence, we can state:
Proposition 2 A marginal increase in the bargaining weight of upstream divisions fosters growth if
it is initially small and hampers growth if it is initially large enough.
18To sum up, Proposition 1 tells us that a higher bargaining weight of upstream divisions unam-
biguosly promotes oﬀshoring. Proposition 2 tells us that this rise of oﬀshoring stimulates growth as
long as that bargaining weight is not too large. The reason is that a higher bargaining weight  in-
creases the share of expenditures accruing to oﬀshorers through two positive indirect eﬀects on their
relative size ("intensive margin") and number ("extensive margin"). On the other hand, a higher 
has a negative direct eﬀect on the fraction of oﬀshorers’ revenues appropriated by their downstream
divisions. While the indirect eﬀects boost oﬀshorers proﬁtability and thus growth by reallocating
labor from production to R&D, the direct eﬀect works in the opposite direction. This eﬀect comes
to dominate when  is large enough, generating a non-linear relation between the bargaining weight
of upstream divisions and the growth rate.
5C o n t r a c t s a n d W e l f a r e
The aim of this section is twofold. On the one hand, we want to clarify how our results depend
on the quality of contract enforcement. In so doing, we ﬁrst characterize the steady state outcome
when oﬀshoring takes place under complete contracts. We then use this characterization to un-
veil the diﬀerent performance of the economy when the transition from no oﬀs h o r i n gt oo ﬀshoring
happens under incomplete rather than complete contracts. This will also highlight the role of ﬁrm
heterogeneity. On the other hand, we want to highlight how incomplete contracts lead to diﬀerent
policy implications with respect to complete contracts.
5.1 Complete contracts
To better understand the role of contractual incompleteness for our results, it is useful to characterize
the steady state outcome of the model in two scenarios: one in which oﬀshoring is inhibited (so that
the hold up problem is not an issue) and the other in which oﬀshoring takes place under complete
contracts.
In both cases at the aggregate level the model with heterogeneous ﬁrms is homomorphic to a
model with homogeneous ﬁrms à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) in which all ﬁrms are identical to
19the average heterogeneous ﬁrm. Accordingly, average productivity (and ultimately the productivity
cutoﬀ)p r o v i d e sas u ﬃcient statistic to describe the aggregate behavior of the economy. When







due to the fact that, by deﬁnition, no entrepreneurs relies on the foreign standardized technology.













where from (6) we have ∗
 =   ∗  e  as the productivity cutoﬀ under contractual complete-












In both case, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), eﬃciency in production is immaterial for
steady state growth and expenditures because it conveys equal incentives to production and innova-
tion. As a result, steady state growth and expenditures are the same in the two complete contract
scenarios:








 −  and  =  =  =  +  (21)
In addition, steady state expenditures are also the same as those with incomplete contracts.
Average productivity aﬀects, instead, the aggregate quantities consumed in the various scenarios




e  ( + ),  =
 − 1

e  ( + ),  =
 − 1

e  ( + ) (22)
where, for notational symmetry, we use e  to relabel the average productivity (10) that prevails
with incomplete oﬀshoring contracts.
Comparing the two complete contract scenarios, we see that the fact that less eﬃcient ﬁrms
oﬀshore for   implies e   e  and thus   . Hence,
20Proposition 3 Making oﬀshoring possible under contractual completeness generates a static welfare
gain due to more production but no dynamic welfare eﬀect through a change in the growth rate.
The reason for this is that oﬀshoring operates as "neutral" technological progress that evenly
augments both the proﬁtability of R&D and the proﬁtability of production. As a result, when ﬁrms
oﬀshore there is no reallocation of labor between R&D and production. All that happens is that
more eﬃcient labor generates more output.
5.2 Incomplete contracts
We can now compare the steady state outcomes with or without incomplete contracts. As for growth
rates, expressions (16) and (21) show that oﬀshoring with incomplete contracts leads to faster growth
w i t hr e s p e c tt ob o t hn oo ﬀshoring and oﬀshoring under complete contracts, the more so the larger
is Ω.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eh a v e











Proposition 4 Making oﬀshoring possible under contractual incompleteness generates dynamic wel-
fare gains due to faster growth.
The reason for this is that oﬀshoring operates as "biased" technological progress that augments
the proﬁtability of R&D more than the proﬁtability of production. As a result, when ﬁrms oﬀshore
there is a reallocation of labor from production to R&D.
Turning to consumption, we have shown in Section 3.1 that incomplete contracts generate two
adverse eﬀects of oﬀshoring on aggregate productivity. First, ﬁrms drawing values of  between e 
and ∗ oﬀshore while they have higher inshored productivity. This does not happen under complete
contracts for which we have e  = ∗. Second, ﬁrms drawing values between ∗ and  do not
oﬀshore whereas in the absence of contractual frictions doing so would increase their productivity.
These adverse eﬀects imply e   e  and, therefore,    so that with oﬀshoring output is always
higher under complete than incomplete contracts.
21Diﬀerently, when it comes to comparing oﬀshoring under contractual incompleteness and no
oﬀshoring only the ﬁrst adverse eﬀect is relevant as ﬁrms with productivity levels between ∗ and
 do not oﬀshore in either case. The ranking in terms of output is therefore ambiguous. In

















that is if the cumulated productivity gain of oﬀshores that are less productive under inshoring
(0 e ) is larger than the cumulated productivity loss for oﬀshorers that are more productive
under inshoring (e   ∗).
These results allow us to state the following:
Proposition 5 Making oﬀshoring possible under contractual incompleteness generates static welfare
gains if the cumulated productivity gains of oﬀshores that would be less productive under inshoring
are larger than the cumulated productivity losses of oﬀshorers that would be more productive under
inshoring.
Whether this is indeed the case or not clearly depends on the way () distributes the produc-
tivity draws  between the two intervals (0 e ) and (e  ∗). This highlights the crucial role of
heterogeneity. For example, if  is Pareto distributed with ()=1− ()
 −,t h e ne   e 
whenever (−1)[2+(1−)( −1)]. In other words, with incomplete contracts oﬀshoring also
generates static gains when there are a lot of unproductive ﬁrms and few productive ones.
5.3 Optimal policy
We are now ready to investigate how incomplete contracts lead to diﬀerent policy implications with
respect to complete contracts when the objective is to implement an eﬃcient outcome maximizing
(1) subject to the aggregate resource constraint without any hold up problem. The eﬃcient outcome
is readily characterized by remembering again that, with complete contracts, at the aggregate level
the model with heterogeneous ﬁrms is homomorphic to a model with homogeneous ﬁrms in which
22all ﬁrms are identical to the average heterogeneous ﬁrm. We can, therefore, invoke the results in




− ( − 1) − ,  =  =  =  (23)
with quantity consumed  = .
The comparison between  and  shows that, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), due to the
positive learning externality in R&D, at the market outcome with complete contracts our economy
grows too slowly. In this case, optimal intervention then requires an R&D subsidy that equalizes
 =  to .S p e c i ﬁcally, if we call 

 the optimal fraction of R&D expenditures paid by the





 +  + 
With incomplete contracts the R&D subsidy alone is not enough due to the underproduction of
the intermediate input and, therefore, of the ﬁnal output. Optimal intervention here requires the
government to subsidize also oﬀshorers’ upstream production. If we call 

 the optimal fraction of




Hence, both R&D and production subsidies are needed to implement the ﬁrst best under incomplete
contracts.
To summarize, we can write:
Proposition 6 With complete contracts welfare is maximized through a subsidy to innovation only.
With incomplete contracts welfare maximization also requires a subsidy to oﬀshored production.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have used an endogenous growth model of North-South oﬀshoring with heterogeneous ﬁrms to
study its dynamic and static eﬀects on the economy when contracts are incomplete in the South.
23In so doing, we have modelled oﬀshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a ﬁrm’s production
chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream one.
On the positive side, we have shown that, when contracts are incomplete, the possibility of oﬀ-
shoring may have favorable implications for economic growth. The key parameter regulating the
growth eﬀect of oﬀshoring is the bargaining power of the upstream division through a non-linear
relation. While a larger upstream bargaining weight unambiguously promotes oﬀshoring, it (hence
increased oﬀshoring) only stimulates growth up to a critical level. Under complete contracts, oﬀ-
shoring has no impact whatsoever on growth. The reason for this is that under complete contracts,
oﬀshoring evenly augments the proﬁtability of R&D and production, whereas with incomplete con-
tracts the gains in proﬁtability are biased towards R&D.
Whether oﬀshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on ﬁrm het-
erogeneity. For example, when productivity draws are Pareto distributed, consumption increases
when there are a lot of unproductive ﬁrms and very few productive ones.
O nt h en o r m a t i v es i d e ,w eh a v es h o wt h a t ,w h e r e a sw i t hc o m p l e t ec o n t r a c t se ﬃciency can be
restored through a subsidy to R&D only, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy to oﬀshored
upstream divisions is needed too.
Contrary to the existing literature, our study uses the industry dynamics of ﬁrm organization
to reveal the possibility of adverse long term eﬀects of oﬀshoring for the North. In addition, it
emphasizes the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity for the social gains from oﬀshoring. This raises the ques-
tion whether analyses on the consequences of oﬀshoring based on real wages can fully absorb the
mechanisms through which it inﬂuences the economy performance. Our analysis has its limitation
and leaves much work for future research on the issue.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Stronger contract enforcement in the South increases the relative size
of oﬀshorers
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is granted by the fundamental theorem of calculus. Moreover, since ∗ is an increasing function of







































































7.2 Properties of the elasticity of oﬀshorers’ market share to the quality





















































as derived in the previous section. Accordingly
ln
ln
=[ 1 + (  − 1)(1 − )]
ln(∗)
ln
+(  − 1)(1 − )





+(  − 1)(1 − )
where ln(∗)ln∗ is the elasticity of the extensive margin, i.e. the percentage change in the
fraction of oﬀshorers when the cutoﬀ changes by one per cent.
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ln∗ +(  − 1)  0
since ∗ =0(all ﬁrms oﬀshore), whereas at  =1it equals
ln
ln







since ∗ = . Hence, lnln is strictly positive and ﬁnite at both  =0and  =1 .
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Oﬀshoring, along with debates and literature related to it, has enjoyed an exponential growth in
recent years. In particular, the controversy on the issue exploded in February 2004 when N. Gregory
Mankiw rationalized oﬀshoring through its long term positive consequences on the US economy.
He argued that oﬀshoring may release domestic resources that can be reallocated to the creation
of new products, new technologies and thus new and better jobs to replace those lost to cheaper
foreign countries.1 Trade economists have since rushed to support. Blinder (2006) calls oﬀshoring
the third industrial revolution, which can eventually be a sound occurrence for all workers, as the
ﬁrst and the second were regardless of initial skepticism. Baldwin (2006) calls the process "a second
unbundling" that has occurred as a consequence of rapidly falling communication and coordination
costs. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) argue how traditional trade theory must give way for
a paradigm more relevant to today’s world, namely trade in "tasks". They show the beneﬁts of this
phenomenon by pointing out its positive impact on real wages of all workers in the home country.2
Finally, Rodriguez-Clare (2009) uses a dynamic model to show that the negative terms of trade eﬀect
of oﬀshoring is outweighed by long-run gains as the origin country adjusts its research eﬀort.
Our aim is to contribute to this debate by highlighting possible gains and losses from oﬀshoring in
an endogenous growth scenario with heterogeneous ﬁrms where the economic beneﬁts of research and
development (R&D) are not fully appropriable by innovators and some of the contracts supporting
production abroad are incomplete.
We develop our argument by modeling an economy consisting of two countries, North and South,
and two sectors, production and R&D. The North is the market for ﬁnal products, which are horizon-
tally diﬀerentiated. Varieties are supplied according to blueprints that are invented and patented by
1Oﬀshoring is frequently blamed by workers and trade unions for the slow pace of job growth in the United States
and for the swelling wage diﬀerential between low and high skill workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001).
2In their contribution, the positive eﬀect of oﬀshoring on wages is driven by a productivity eﬀect as oﬀshoring
translates into a form of technological progress. These results are qualiﬁed in Kohler (2004) and in Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007), where domestic workers only beneﬁt if the labor cost savings of oﬀshoring are associated with
the labor intensive sector.
2R&D labs. In the wake of Grossman and Helpman (1991), endogenous growth is introduced through
a positive learning externality in R&D.
To enter the production market, entrepreneurs must ﬁrst purchase a patent, and then engage in
process innovation with uncertain outcome to ﬁnd their capacity in using the patent. In particular,
an entrepreneur’s capacity is determined by a random draw from some common productivity distri-
bution as in Melitz (2003). Each entrepreneur organizes production along a vertical chain consisting
of two stages, intermediate supply ("upstream") and ﬁnal assembly ("downstream"), performed by
two divisions within a vertically integrated ﬁrm. Vertical integration is due to the presence of tacit
knowledge that cannot be transmitted outside ﬁrm boundaries. Both R&D and ﬁnal assembly are
assumed to take place in North only. Intermediates can be produced in North or South. This
is assumed to be a potential site for the production of intermediates using a standardized tradi-
tional technology that oﬀers productivity gains to entrepreneurs with bad draws, provided that they
are willing to bear the additional trade costs associated with international shipments.3 We call
"inshoring" an organizational structure in which both production stages take place in North and
"oﬀshoring" the alternative organizational structure in which intermediates are ﬁrst produced in
South and then assembled in North.
The two countries diﬀer in terms of the quality of contract enforcement between divisions. Specif-
ically, contracts are complete when both the upstream and the downstream divisions are located in
North. They are incomplete when the upstream division is located in South due to the lack of credible
institutions to perfectly enforce contracts.4 We model contractual incompleteness following recent
contributions that study ﬁrms’ ownership and location choices in environments in which economic
3Using Japanese ﬁrm level data from the period 1994-2000, Hijzen, Inui, and Todo (2007) give empirical evidence
on how the scope for productivity improvements from oﬀshoring depends negatively on the initial level of productivity
of the ﬁrm. This in turn provides an eﬀective channel for less productive ﬁrms to catch up and restore competitiveness.
4Nunn (2007) for instance uses several proxies to measure contract incompleteness in the South: a weighed average
of a number of variables that measure individuals’ perceptions of the eﬀectiveness and predictability of the judiciary
and the enforcement of contracts in 159 countries between 1997 and 1998 from Kaufmann et al. (2003); the measures
of judicial quality and contract enforcement from Gwartney and Lawson (2003) and World Bank (2004).
3interactions suﬀer from hold up problems.5 More precisely, we follow Grossman and Helpman (2002)
in adopting the transaction cost approach à la Williamson (1975, 1985), whose key idea is that the
quality of deliverables in a bilateral transaction is unobservable by third parties so that, after the
deliverables have been produced, the stakeholders involved in the transaction have to bargain on
some division of the surplus it would generate.6 However, by assuming that upstream-downstream
transactions take place within the boundaries of ﬁrms, we abstract from the ownership decision and
focus, instead, on the location decision. In other words, what generates contractual incompleteness
is not the crossing of ﬁrms’ boundaries but rather the crossing of countries’ borders.
This setup generates new positive and normative insights on the dynamic and static aggregate
eﬀects of oﬀshoring. On the positive side, we show that, when contracts are incomplete, the pos-
sibility of oﬀshoring has favorable implications for economic growth. That does not happen when
contracts are complete, in which case oﬀshoring has no impact whatsoever on growth. The key
parameter regulating the growth eﬀect of oﬀshoring with incomplete contracts is the bargaining
power of upstream divisions. In particular, we show that, while a marginal increase in the bargain-
ing power of upstream divisions always encourages more ﬁrms to oﬀshore, it fosters growth only if
such bargaining power is initially small enough. Otherwise, oﬀshoring activities encouraged by a
stronger upstream bargaining power slows down growth. Lastly, we show that whether oﬀshoring
with incomplete contracts also favors steady state consumption depends on ﬁrm heterogeneity. For
example, when productivity draws are Pareto distributed, consumption increases when there are a
lot of unproductive ﬁrms and very few productive ones.
On the normative side, we highlight that, just like in Grossman and Helpman (1991), with oﬀ-
shoring under complete contracts the endogenous growth rate of the economy is suboptimally low
due the positive learning externality in R&D. In this case, eﬃciency is restored through a subsidy to
R&D only. This is, instead, not enough under incomplete contracts as the hold up problem causes
underproduction. Accordingly, with incomplete contracts, the R&D subsidy has to be complemented
5See Helpman (2006) for a survey.
6See, e.g., Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) for the alternative property-rights approach to model
incomplete contracts and hold up problems à la Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) .
4by a production subsidy to oﬀshored upstream divisions.7
To the best of our knowldge, our analysis represents the ﬁrst attempt to study the long run
consequences of oﬀshoring with ﬁrm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. A large branch of the
international trade literature on ﬁrm organization has been devoted to the incomplete nature of
contracts in arrangements between ﬁrms. On the dynamic side of this front, Naghavi and Ottaviano
(2006, 2008, 2009) use a growth model à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) to study the potential ten-
sion that may arise between the static and dynamic implications of the fragmentation of production.
They ﬁnd that while outsourcing gives rise to complementary upstream and downstream innovation,
incomplete contracts may prevent static gains of specialized production from carrying through in
the long run. They also ﬁnd that oﬀshoring can slow growth by reducing the feedback from oﬀ-
shored plants to labs. Yet, in their model there is no ﬁrm heterogeneity so that, in equilibrium,
ﬁrms either all outsource or they all vertically integrate.8 Grossman and Helpman (2004), Antràs
and Helpman (2004) and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) are among the ﬁrst papers to study
the organization of ﬁrms in the presence of heterogeneity in a static set up. Our contribution adds
to this literature by studying the industry dynamics of ﬁrm organization, in particular the interac-
tions between oﬀshoring and growth.9 Our model also diﬀers from previous work the organizational
choices of heterogeneous ﬁrms as we do not apply the typical extra ﬁxed cost that generally leads
more productive ﬁrms to undertake a more costly form of organization. This helps us avert potential
misleading assumptions as it is not clear how ﬁxed costs can be ranked across organizational forms.10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 charac-
7This stresses a novel reason to support FDI that supplements those already highlighted in the literature. See,
e.g., Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, Ch.10).
8The same is true in the Ricardian growth model by Ottaviano (2009).
9The only other growth models with heterogeneous ﬁrms to our knowledge are Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008)
and Segerstrom and Gustaﬀson (2009), which explore the impact of trade liberalization on growth in the presence of
heterogeneous ﬁrms. These papers, however, do not investigate the impact of contractual incompleteness.
10For instance, Antràs and Helpman (2004) assume that ﬁxed costs of vertical integration are larger while Grossman,
Helpman and Szeidl (2005) suppose that outsourcing ﬁx e dc o s t sa r em o r es u b s t a n t i a l .
5terizes the market equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the interactions between oﬀshoring, innovation
and economic growth. Section 5 highlights the role of contractual incompleteness in determining the
long run eﬀects of oﬀshoring. Section 6 concludes.
2A D y n a m i c M o d e l o f O ﬀshoring
The economy consists of two countries, North and South. We assume that all workers and consumers
belong to the North but can be employed in South as expatriates to work in the oﬀshored plants.
Hence the South is simply a potential production site. This emphasizes the tacitness of knowledge
by ruling out perfect substitutability of Southern labor for Northern labor, with the intention of
abstracting from typical labor market debates on wages that have been widely studied empirically
and are being widely studied theoretically parallel to the writing of this paper.11 This helps single out
the additional impacts of oﬀshoring on growth in the home country that have often been neglected in
the literature. In addition, observed empirical evidence does not always approve of the phenomenon
of one job shifted abroad being immediately one job released at home.12
2.1 Overview and timing of events
Before getting into the details of the model, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the way it works.
Consumers have CES preferences over a horizontally diﬀerentiated good . The production of each
variety of good  requires a blueprint, an intermediate input and assembly. Blueprints are created
by independent R&D labs that sell their blueprints to entrepreneurs. All labs operate in North.
An entrepreneur discovers her ability to turn the acquired blueprint in a sellable product only after
buying. Her ability is determined by a random productivity draw. Upon observing its productivity ,
the entrepreneur organizes her ﬁrm as a vertical value chain with an "upstream" division producing
the intermediate input and a "downstream" division turning it into the ﬁnal product. While ﬁnal
production takes place in North, the ﬁrm can either "inshore" intermediate production in North,
11For recent theoretical analyses of oﬀshoring as means of trade and its eﬀects on real wages see Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodriguez-Clare (2009).
12See for instance Debande (2006) for the US and Japanese cases.
6using its own technology, or "oﬀshore" it to South using a cost-reducing standardized technology. In
this way, oﬀshoring oﬀers a viable alternative to the least eﬃcient ﬁrms only. This alternative comes
with strings attached. On the one hand, shipping intermediates from South to North incurs trade
costs. On the other hand, oﬀshoring takes place under contractual incompleteness, which generates
further costs due to ex post bargaining.
To summarize, in each period  the following sequence of events take place. First, independent
labs engage in R&D to create new patented blueprints. Second, entrepreneurs enter by purchasing
a blueprint, realize their productivity levels in terms of non-standardized production and choose the
location of upstream divisions. Third, upstream divisions manufacture the inputs needed by their
downstream counterparts. Fourth, once intermediate production is completed, the upstream and
downstream divisions of producers that have oﬀshored bargain over the share of total revenues from
ﬁnal sales and inputs are handed over by the former to the latter. Lastly, ﬁnal assembly takes place
and ﬁnal products are sold to households.
2.2 Demand side
There are  inﬁnitely-lived households with identical preferences deﬁned over the consumption of
a horizontally diﬀerentiated good . The utility function is assumed to be instantaneously Cobb-














is a CES quantity index in which () is the consumption of variety , () is the number of available
varieties of good ,a n d is the own and cross demand elasticity of any variety, and thus an inverse
measure of the degree of product diﬀerentiation between varieties. Households have perfect foresight
and they can borrow and lend freely in a perfect capital market at instantaneous interest rate ().
Using multi-stage budgeting to solve their utility maximization problem, households ﬁrst allocate
7their income ﬂow between savings and expenditures. This yields a time path of total expenditures




= () −  (2)
where we have used the fact that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals unity. By








Households then allocate their expenditures across all varieties, which yields the instantaneous
demand function
()=()()−  ∈ [0()] (4)




is aggregate demand. Throughout the rest of the paper, we leave the time dependence of variables
implicit when this does not generate confusion.
2.3 Supply side
There are two factors of production in the economy. Labor is inelastically supplied by households
and each household supplies one unit of labor so that we can use  to refer both to the number
of households and the total endowment of labor. Labor is freely mobile between countries and
it is chosen as numeraire. The other factor is knowledge capital in the form of blueprints for
the production of diﬀerentiated varieties. Blueprints are protected by inﬁnitely lived patents and
depreciate at a constant rate .
There are two sectors, innovation (R&D) and production. Perfectly competitive labs invent blue-
prints for the production of the diﬀerentiated varieties. The production of each variety requires a
single blueprint and consists of an upstream and a downstream stage. Entrepreneurs enter by buying
8the rights to use the blueprints and split their activities between an upstream division supplying
intermediates and a downstream division assembling them. Assembly takes place only in North
whereas intermediate inputs can be produced also in South using an older standardized traditional
technology ("oﬀshoring"). Southern production takes place through a standardized traditional tech-
nology, which allows one unit of labor to produce   0 units of intermediates.
Shipping the intermediate inputs back to the North for assembly incurs iceberg trade costs:
1 units must be shipped for one unit to reach destination. Trade costs can be embedded into
the productivity parameter of the South without loss of generality. Hence, throughout the rest of
the paper, we will use  =  to denote the standard southern technology inclusive of trade
costs. Northern production can rely on new advanced technologies that are generated by process
innovation. This is a risky endeavor as long as its outcome is uncertain and the property rights on
patents have to be bought in advance before experimenting new production processes. Speciﬁcally,
after buying the rights to use the blueprints from labs, producers randomly draw their productivity
level  from a continuous cumulative distribution () with support [0∞) so that oﬀshoring oﬀers
productivity gains to producers with bad draws  . Final assembly in turn needs one unit of
the intermediate component for each unit of the ﬁnal good no matter where intermediates originate
from. Intermediates are variety-speciﬁc: once produced for a certain assembly line, they have no
alternative use.
Oﬀshoring is associated with contractual costs that arise from weak legal institutions in the
South. Speciﬁcally, only high quality variety-speciﬁc intermediates can be processed whereas low
quality ones are useless even though supplied at zero cost. Contracts between the upstream and
the downstream divisions are complete when botha r el o c a t e di nN o r t h ,b u ti n c o m p l e t ew h e nt h e
upstream division is oﬀshored to South. In this case the quality of intermediates can not be assessed
by third parties. That generates a hold up problem: after the upstream division has supplied its
speciﬁc input, it has to reach an agreement with the downstream division on how to share the joint
surplus (revenues) from ﬁnal sales. The agreement is reached through Nash bargaining and we
denote the bargaining weight of the upstream division by .
9Finally, we introduce endogenous growth by assuming that R&D faces a learning curve so that the
marginal R&D cost of blueprints decreases with the number of blueprints that have been successfully
introduced in the past. Speciﬁcally, the invention of a new blueprint requires  units of labor where
0 is a parameter and  is the total number of blueprints that have already been patented.13
Given the chosen functional form, some initial stock of implemented blueprints 0  0 is needed to
have ﬁnite costs of innovation at all times. We assume that this stock belongs to North.
3 Market Equilibrium
3.1 Production
At time  the instantaneous equilibrium is found by solving the model backwards from ﬁnal produc-
tion to R&D. Varieties can be sold to ﬁnal customers by two types of producers: "inshorers" have
both divisions in North whereas "oﬀshorers" have their upstream divisions in South and their down-
stream ones in North. Under inshoring, as contracts are complete, the upstream and downstream
divisions of the same ﬁrm ﬁrst maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and then share it according to their bargain-
ing weights. This implies that the upstream division of a producer with labor productivity  selects
intermediate output () to maximize operating proﬁt ()=() = ()() where
(), () and () are ﬁnal revenues, ﬁnal price and ﬁnal output (itself equal to intermediate






with associated output ()=()=()− and operating proﬁt ()=() =
()1−.A s h a r e  of () goes to the upstream division and the rest to the downstream
one.
13The assumed shape of the learning curve serves analytical solvability and the comparison with Grossman and
Helpman (1991). In equilibrium it yields a ‘size eﬀect’, meaning that larger countries grow faster. To avoid this this
prediction that runs against the empirical evidence, one could assume that the intensity of the learning spillover is
lower, i.e.  with 0 1 (Jones, 1995). This would turn our setup into a quasi-endogenous growth model in
the wake of Segerstrom (1998).
10Under oﬀshoring, the producer uses the standardized technology with upstream labor produc-
tivity  and gets the joint surplus of its divisions under incomplete contracts. This surplus is given
by the revenues from ﬁnal sales and is divided between divisions through ex post Nash bargaining.
Absent any outside option, revenues are therefore split according to the bargaining weights of the
t w op a r t i e sw i t has h a r e(1 −) going to the downstream division and the remaining share  going
to the upstream one. The upstream division decides how much input  to produce anticipating
that bargaining outcome. Hence, it maximizes  =  −  where  and  are ﬁnal price
and ﬁnal output (itself equal to intermediate production). Given the demand curve (4), this yields






with associated output  =  = −
 and revenues  =  = 1−
 .14 As h a r e =
(1 − ) goes to the downstream division while the complementary share goes to the upstream
one. Accordingly, after subtracting labor costs, the upstream division is left with  = :
larger upstream bargaining weight and stronger product diﬀerentiation shift a larger share of a
given joint surplus  from downstream to upstream divisions. Hence, the overall operating proﬁt
of the oﬀshorer is  =  +  =[ 1+(  − 1)(1 − )].15 Since the downstream division does
not contribute anything before the bargaining stage, the joint surplus  (and the joint proﬁt  as
well) is at its maximum when  goes to one. In other words, when  goes to one, the incomplete
contract outcome converges to the complete contract one.
As producers can freely choose between inshoring and oﬀshoring, the operating proﬁts they earn
are equal to () ≡ max[()] The fact that () is an increasing function of productivity 
implies that there exists a unique threshold productivity level ("cutoﬀ") ∗ above which producers
14The upstream division does not face an incentive constraint as the optimal output is always positive.
15For the upstream division the adverse incentive due to ex post bargaining under incomplete contracts has exactly
t h es a m ei m p a c ta sa ni c e b e r gt r a d ec o s tt h a tm e l t saf r a c t i o n(1 − ) of intermediate output shipped from South to
North, and therefore does not generate revenues for that division. The fact that here the fraction (1 − ) of revenues
is recovered by the downstream division explains why the overall operating proﬁto ft h eo ﬀshorer is larger than that
of the simple iceberg case.
11prefer to inshore. This cutoﬀ solves (∗)= and is therefore equal to
∗ =( )[1+(1− )( − 1)]
1
−1 (6)
The cutoﬀ is decreasing in  because weaker product diﬀerentiation shifts surplus from upstream
to downstream divisions exacerbating intermediate underproduction and thus promoting inshoring.
For symmetric reasons, the cutoﬀ is increasing in the upstream bargaining weight .I t i s a l s o
increasing in  as oﬀshoring is fostered by any improvement in the productivity of the standardized
technology  or any fall in trade cost .
We can therefore highlight:
Proposition 1 A marginal increase in the bargaining weight of upstream divisions encourages more
ﬁrms to oﬀshore.
Since 1() is the amount of labor embedded in unit revenues, it will turn out to be useful
to denote by e  ≡  the "delivered" productivity of oﬀshored labor. We will call this simply
"oﬀshored productivity" and we will contrast it with producer-speciﬁc "inshored productivity" .
Note that (6) shows that a marginal producer drawing exactly ∗ has higher inshored than oﬀshored
productivity (∗  e )s ot h a tt h er a n g e( e  ∗)i d e n t i ﬁes producers whose decisions to oﬀshore
reduce aggregate productivity. Moreover, due to ∗  0,t h ec u t o ﬀ ∗ achieves its maximum
value  at  equal to 1, so any other value of  implies ∗  . Hence, incomplete contracts
generate two adverse eﬀects of oﬀshoring on aggregate productivity. First, ﬁrms drawing values of
 between e  and ∗ oﬀshore while they have higher inshored productivity. Second, ﬁrms drawing
values between ∗ and  do not oﬀshore whereas in the absence of contractual frictions doing
so would increase their productivity. In Figure 1 we call these adverse eﬀects penalization 1 and
penalization 2 respectively. Indeed, when  is equal to 1, (6) implies ∗ = e  =  so that all ﬁrms
with a productivity level   oﬀshore and their decision to do so improves aggregate productivity.






























At the innovation stage, labs invent new blueprints at a marginal cost that depends on acquired








 ≡ ,  is labor employed in inventing new blueprints,  is its productivity and  is
the rate of depreciation.
Due to learning, as innovation cumulates, it becomes increasingly cheaper to introduce new
blueprints and, being priced at marginal cost, their value falls through time. Speciﬁcally, if we





Labs pay their researchers by borrowing at the interest rate  and know that the resulting patents
will generate instantaneous dividends equal to the expected proﬁts of the corresponding producers .
Arbitrage in the capital market then requires the dividends  and capital gains
·
 to match interest
payments  and depreciation  so that:







where the equality is granted by the deﬁnition of .
3.3 Aggregation
In characterizing the aggregate behavior of our heterogeneous economy, we follow Melitz (2003) and
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Figure 1: Industry partition










is the average (output weighted) productivity of inshorers. Since ∗  e ,w eh a v ee   ∗  e ,
e   e e and e ∗  0. Figure 1 shows a ranking of the productivity levels.16
We also deﬁne  as the share of expenditures going to oﬀshorers, and  and  as the cor-
responding exact price and quantity indices such that  = . Analogously, we deﬁne  as
the share of expenditures going to inshorers, and  and  as the corresponding exact price and






,  = {[1 − (∗)]}
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,  = {(∗)}
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 + [1 − (∗)] e 1−

ª 1
1− ,  =


16While   is larger than ∗ in Figure 1, this is not always necessarily the case.
143.4 Financial market clearing
Since producers discover their productivity only after acquiring the right to use a patented blueprint,
the dividends they are willing to pay to labs equal their expected operating proﬁts
 = (∗) +[ 1− (∗)]e  (12)
where, since  = [(∗)], the operating proﬁto fat y p i c a lo ﬀshorer  can be rewritten in
terms of aggregate variables as
 =
[1 + ( − 1)(1 − )]
(∗)

















where Ω ≡ (1 − ) is the share of aggregate expenditures accruing to the downstream divisions
of oﬀshorers. Expression (13) shows that expected proﬁts are an increasing function of Ω.W h e n
a higher share of expenditures in the economy goes to oﬀshorers, expected proﬁts are larger in the
industry. To see this, note that keeping ﬁxed total expenditure  and the proportion of oﬀshoring
ﬁrms (∗), shifting a unit of expenditures from inshorers  to oﬀshorers  increases average
proﬁts because the downstream oﬀshored divisions earn a share 1 −  of revenues  while the
inshored ones only earn a share 1 −  of proﬁts  = .17 This also explains why the positive
impact of Ω on  is larger when  is larger. Larger downstream bargaining power (1 − ) also
increases expected proﬁt sa tt h et i m eo fe n t r y .







[1 + ( − 1)Ω] −
˙ 

−  −  (14)
17Inshores have a higher sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution as with oﬀshoring all variable costs of producing
intermediates are passed over to upstream suppliers. See Grossman and Helpman (2002, p. 102) for more detail.
153.5 Labor market clearing
Aggregate labor endowment  is absorbed by innovation ()a sw e l la sb yi n s h o r e da n do ﬀshored
upstream production. Inshorers’ and oﬀshorers’ employment levels amount to  = (e e ) and
 = () respectively. Accordingly, given (11), total employment in upstream production
simpliﬁes to















(1 − Ω) (15)
Employment in production is a decreasing function of the share Ω of aggregate expenditures accruing
to the downstream divisions of oﬀshorers. This is the dual of the previously discussed result that
expected proﬁts increase with Ω as long as larger expected proﬁts induce a reallocation of labor from
production to R&D.
4O ﬀshoring and Growth
The market clearing conditions (14) and (15) deﬁne a dynamic system in two unknowns: the growth
rate of the stock of patents (

) and the expenditures level (). A unique balanced growth path
exists along which these variables are constant and is achieved without any transition dynamics.18
Calling the corresponding growth rate and expenditures level by  and  respectively, then im-
posing
·
 = ,  =  and
·















(1 − Ω) − ,  =  +  (16)
While expenditures  do not depend on Ω, the growth rate  is instead an increasing function of
Ω. The reason is that, by deﬁnition, a rise in Ω shifts expenditures from inshorers to oﬀshorers. This
shift, as discussed above, generates larger expected proﬁts and smaller employment in production.
The resulting reallocation of labor from production to R&D promotes innovation and growth.
18See Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.3) for details.
16Since  does not depend on Ω, the bargaining weight  does not aﬀect expenditures. It aﬀects,
however, the growth rate through various channels funneled through the impact of Ω on .T o
disentangle these channels, we use (10) and (11) to rewrite the share Ω of expenditures accruing to
the downstream divisions of oﬀshorers as













where e  ≡  is oﬀshored productivity and e  is the average (oﬀshored and inshored) productivity
as deﬁn e di n( 1 0 ) . S i n c eΩ  0, the sign of the impact of  on  depends on the sign of
Ω. This can be decomposed as:
Ω





where  ≡ .
Consider a marginal increase in .T h eﬁrst term on the right hand side is the direct eﬀect of
larger .I ti sn e g a t i v ea si ti d e n t i ﬁes the corresponding fall in the share of expenditures accruing to
the downstream divisions of oﬀshorers holding the overall share of expenditures accruing to oﬀshorers
constant. It captures a pure surplus reallocation between divisions as a higher upstream bargaining
weight transfers surplus from downstream to oﬀshored upstream divisions.
The second term on the right hand side of (17) is the indirect eﬀect.I t i d e n t i ﬁes the change
in the overall share of expenditures accruing to oﬀshorers. This adjustment takes place along two
margins: the relative number of oﬀs h o r e r sa sd e t e r m i n e db y(∗) ("extensive margin") and their











where e  = ˜ 1−. The impact of larger  is positive on both margins. Since a larger bargaining
weight of upstream divisions alleviates their underproduction of intermediates, as  rises not only
more producers decide to oﬀshore, but also oﬀshorers become larger. Along the extensive margin,
by (6) we have ∗  0 and thus (∗)  0. Along the intensive margin, using e  ≡ 

























which, given ∗  0 and (∗)∗  0, is an increasing function of  (see Appendix 1 for a
proof that  (e )  0). Hence, we can conclude that   0,w h i c h ,g i v e n( 1 7 ) ,i m p l i e s
that improved contract enforcement in the South has ambiguous eﬀects on Ω and, therefore, on .
To shed light on such ambiguity, we can manipulate (17) to show that a higher bargaining weight
of upstream divisions promotes growth when the elasticity of the oﬀshorers’ market share  to  is







If the reverse is true, a higher bargaining weight of upstream divisions hampers growth. Figure 1
shows the eﬀect of an increase in  on the productivity distribution of ﬁrms graphically. Larger 
directly raises e , while it reduces [1 − (∗)] e  through a change in ∗. This makes the change in
average productivity e  ambiguous in , yet inferior to the rise in e . Also, the productivity range
along which oﬀshoring raises aggregate productivity increases if the change in the intensive margin
is larger than that in the extensive margin (e   ∗) so that the two values converge, and
falls if the opposite holds so that they diverge. Finally, note that the values achieved by lnln
at  =0and at  =1are both strictly positive and ﬁnite provided that the elasticity of the extensive
margin ln(∗)ln∗ is also positive and ﬁnite, as in the case of all the commonly used families
of cumulative density functions (see Appendix 2 for a proof). Then, since (1 − ) equals zero at
 =0and goes to inﬁnity when  goes to one, there must exist a threshold value of  below which
the inequality (19) holds and above which it is violated. Hence, there exists a unique threshold value
for the bargaining weight of upstream divisions  such that Ω  ()0 and, thus,   ()0
if and only if  f a l l sb e l o w( a b o v e )t h a tv a l u e .
Hence, we can state:
Proposition 2 A marginal increase in the bargaining weight of upstream divisions fosters growth if
it is initially small and hampers growth if it is initially large enough.
18To sum up, Proposition 1 tells us that a higher bargaining weight of upstream divisions unam-
biguosly promotes oﬀshoring. Proposition 2 tells us that this rise of oﬀshoring stimulates growth as
long as that bargaining weight is not too large. The reason is that a higher bargaining weight  in-
creases the share of expenditures accruing to oﬀshorers through two positive indirect eﬀects on their
relative size ("intensive margin") and number ("extensive margin"). On the other hand, a higher 
has a negative direct eﬀect on the fraction of oﬀshorers’ revenues appropriated by their downstream
divisions. While the indirect eﬀects boost oﬀshorers proﬁtability and thus growth by reallocating
labor from production to R&D, the direct eﬀect works in the opposite direction. This eﬀect comes
to dominate when  is large enough, generating a non-linear relation between the bargaining weight
of upstream divisions and the growth rate.
5C o n t r a c t s a n d W e l f a r e
The aim of this section is twofold. On the one hand, we want to clarify how our results depend
on the quality of contract enforcement. In so doing, we ﬁrst characterize the steady state outcome
when oﬀshoring takes place under complete contracts. We then use this characterization to un-
veil the diﬀerent performance of the economy when the transition from no oﬀs h o r i n gt oo ﬀshoring
happens under incomplete rather than complete contracts. This will also highlight the role of ﬁrm
heterogeneity. On the other hand, we want to highlight how incomplete contracts lead to diﬀerent
policy implications with respect to complete contracts.
5.1 Complete contracts
To better understand the role of contractual incompleteness for our results, it is useful to characterize
the steady state outcome of the model in two scenarios: one in which oﬀshoring is inhibited (so that
the hold up problem is not an issue) and the other in which oﬀshoring takes place under complete
contracts.
In both cases at the aggregate level the model with heterogeneous ﬁrms is homomorphic to a
model with homogeneous ﬁrms à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) in which all ﬁrms are identical to
19the average heterogeneous ﬁrm. Accordingly, average productivity (and ultimately the productivity
cutoﬀ)p r o v i d e sas u ﬃcient statistic to describe the aggregate behavior of the economy. When







due to the fact that, by deﬁnition, no entrepreneurs relies on the foreign standardized technology.













where from (6) we have ∗
 =   ∗  e  as the productivity cutoﬀ under contractual complete-












In both case, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), eﬃciency in production is immaterial for
steady state growth and expenditures because it conveys equal incentives to production and innova-
tion. As a result, steady state growth and expenditures are the same in the two complete contract
scenarios:








 −  and  =  =  =  +  (21)
In addition, steady state expenditures are also the same as those with incomplete contracts.
Average productivity aﬀects, instead, the aggregate quantities consumed in the various scenarios




e  ( + ),  =
 − 1

e  ( + ),  =
 − 1

e  ( + ) (22)
where, for notational symmetry, we use e  to relabel the average productivity (10) that prevails
with incomplete oﬀshoring contracts.
Comparing the two complete contract scenarios, we see that the fact that less eﬃcient ﬁrms
oﬀshore for   implies e   e  and thus   . Hence,
20Proposition 3 Making oﬀshoring possible under contractual completeness generates a static welfare
gain due to more production but no dynamic welfare eﬀect through a change in the growth rate.
The reason for this is that oﬀshoring operates as "neutral" technological progress that evenly
augments both the proﬁtability of R&D and the proﬁtability of production. As a result, when ﬁrms
oﬀshore there is no reallocation of labor between R&D and production. All that happens is that
more eﬃcient labor generates more output.
5.2 Incomplete contracts
We can now compare the steady state outcomes with or without incomplete contracts. As for growth
rates, expressions (16) and (21) show that oﬀshoring with incomplete contracts leads to faster growth
w i t hr e s p e c tt ob o t hn oo ﬀshoring and oﬀshoring under complete contracts, the more so the larger
is Ω.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eh a v e











Proposition 4 Making oﬀshoring possible under contractual incompleteness generates dynamic wel-
fare gains due to faster growth.
The reason for this is that oﬀshoring operates as "biased" technological progress that augments
the proﬁtability of R&D more than the proﬁtability of production. As a result, when ﬁrms oﬀshore
there is a reallocation of labor from production to R&D.
Turning to consumption, we have shown in Section 3.1 that incomplete contracts generate two
adverse eﬀects of oﬀshoring on aggregate productivity. First, ﬁrms drawing values of  between e 
and ∗ oﬀshore while they have higher inshored productivity. This does not happen under complete
contracts for which we have e  = ∗. Second, ﬁrms drawing values between ∗ and  do not
oﬀshore whereas in the absence of contractual frictions doing so would increase their productivity.
These adverse eﬀects imply e   e  and, therefore,    so that with oﬀshoring output is always
higher under complete than incomplete contracts.
21Diﬀerently, when it comes to comparing oﬀshoring under contractual incompleteness and no
oﬀshoring only the ﬁrst adverse eﬀect is relevant as ﬁrms with productivity levels between ∗ and
 do not oﬀshore in either case. The ranking in terms of output is therefore ambiguous. In

















that is if the cumulated productivity gain of oﬀshores that are less productive under inshoring
(0 e ) is larger than the cumulated productivity loss for oﬀshorers that are more productive
under inshoring (e   ∗).
These results allow us to state the following:
Proposition 5 Making oﬀshoring possible under contractual incompleteness generates static welfare
gains if the cumulated productivity gains of oﬀshores that would be less productive under inshoring
are larger than the cumulated productivity losses of oﬀshorers that would be more productive under
inshoring.
Whether this is indeed the case or not clearly depends on the way () distributes the produc-
tivity draws  between the two intervals (0 e ) and (e  ∗). This highlights the crucial role of
heterogeneity. For example, if  is Pareto distributed with ()=1− ()
 −,t h e ne   e 
whenever (−1)[2+(1−)( −1)]. In other words, with incomplete contracts oﬀshoring also
generates static gains when there are a lot of unproductive ﬁrms and few productive ones.
5.3 Optimal policy
We are now ready to investigate how incomplete contracts lead to diﬀerent policy implications with
respect to complete contracts when the objective is to implement an eﬃcient outcome maximizing
(1) subject to the aggregate resource constraint without any hold up problem. The eﬃcient outcome
is readily characterized by remembering again that, with complete contracts, at the aggregate level
the model with heterogeneous ﬁrms is homomorphic to a model with homogeneous ﬁrms in which
22all ﬁrms are identical to the average heterogeneous ﬁrm. We can, therefore, invoke the results in




− ( − 1) − ,  =  =  =  (23)
with quantity consumed  = .
The comparison between  and  shows that, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), due to the
positive learning externality in R&D, at the market outcome with complete contracts our economy
grows too slowly. In this case, optimal intervention then requires an R&D subsidy that equalizes
 =  to .S p e c i ﬁcally, if we call 

 the optimal fraction of R&D expenditures paid by the





 +  + 
With incomplete contracts the R&D subsidy alone is not enough due to the underproduction of
the intermediate input and, therefore, of the ﬁnal output. Optimal intervention here requires the
government to subsidize also oﬀshorers’ upstream production. If we call 

 the optimal fraction of




Hence, both R&D and production subsidies are needed to implement the ﬁrst best under incomplete
contracts.
To summarize, we can write:
Proposition 6 With complete contracts welfare is maximized through a subsidy to innovation only.
With incomplete contracts welfare maximization also requires a subsidy to oﬀshored production.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have used an endogenous growth model of North-South oﬀshoring with heterogeneous ﬁrms to
study its dynamic and static eﬀects on the economy when contracts are incomplete in the South.
23In so doing, we have modelled oﬀshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a ﬁrm’s production
chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream one.
On the positive side, we have shown that, when contracts are incomplete, the possibility of oﬀ-
shoring may have favorable implications for economic growth. The key parameter regulating the
growth eﬀect of oﬀshoring is the bargaining power of the upstream division through a non-linear
relation. While a larger upstream bargaining weight unambiguously promotes oﬀshoring, it (hence
increased oﬀshoring) only stimulates growth up to a critical level. Under complete contracts, oﬀ-
shoring has no impact whatsoever on growth. The reason for this is that under complete contracts,
oﬀshoring evenly augments the proﬁtability of R&D and production, whereas with incomplete con-
tracts the gains in proﬁtability are biased towards R&D.
Whether oﬀshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on ﬁrm het-
erogeneity. For example, when productivity draws are Pareto distributed, consumption increases
when there are a lot of unproductive ﬁrms and very few productive ones.
O nt h en o r m a t i v es i d e ,w eh a v es h o wt h a t ,w h e r e a sw i t hc o m p l e t ec o n t r a c t se ﬃciency can be
restored through a subsidy to R&D only, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy to oﬀshored
upstream divisions is needed too.
Contrary to the existing literature, our study uses the industry dynamics of ﬁrm organization
to reveal the possibility of adverse long term eﬀects of oﬀshoring for the North. In addition, it
emphasizes the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity for the social gains from oﬀshoring. This raises the ques-
tion whether analyses on the consequences of oﬀshoring based on real wages can fully absorb the
mechanisms through which it inﬂuences the economy performance. Our analysis has its limitation
and leaves much work for future research on the issue.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Stronger contract enforcement in the South increases the relative size
of oﬀshorers











=( 1− ) (1 + (1 − )( − 1))
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is granted by the fundamental theorem of calculus. Moreover, since ∗ is an increasing function of







































































7.2 Properties of the elasticity of oﬀshorers’ market share to the quality





















































as derived in the previous section. Accordingly
ln
ln
=[ 1 + (  − 1)(1 − )]
ln(∗)
ln
+(  − 1)(1 − )





+(  − 1)(1 − )
where ln(∗)ln∗ is the elasticity of the extensive margin, i.e. the percentage change in the
fraction of oﬀshorers when the cutoﬀ changes by one per cent.
Given
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∙
(1 − )2
1+( 1− )( − 1)
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ln∗ +( 1− )
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ln∗ +(  − 1)  0
since ∗ =0(all ﬁrms oﬀshore), whereas at  =1it equals
ln
ln







since ∗ = . Hence, lnln is strictly positive and ﬁnite at both  =0and  =1 .
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